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RETROACTIVITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL

DECISIONS-CRIMINAL

PROCE-

United States Supreme Court has held that retroactive
effect will not be given to a constitutional decision where the newly
established doctrine was neither judicially foreshadowed nor enhances the accuracy of criminal trials.
DURE-The

Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338 (1984).
On September 27, 1973, Norman Stumes was arrested in Green
Bay, Wisconsin, on pending perjury and felony check charges.' At
the time of his arrest, Stumes was a suspect in the death of Joyce
Hoff in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.2 Stumes spoke with his Sioux
Falls attorney the next day by phone, and was advised not to make
any statements before returning to South Dakota.3 Three Sioux
Falls police officers, who went to Green Bay to bring him back,
spoke with him on the morning of October 1:1 After they read him
his Miranda5 rights, Stumes indicated he understood them and
would not object to speaking to the officers without his attorney
being present.6 Questioning ceased when he refused to say whether
he would take a lie detector test without talking to his attorney
first.7 Stumes was questioned again in the afternoon without renewal of his Miranda warnings. 8 He admitted Hoff's death had
been accidental, but then refused to talk any further until he had
spoken with his attorney.9 The next day, when the 500 mile trip to
Sioux Falls began, Stumes, after receiving a second Miranda warning, indicated that he would be willing to talk.10 Stumes recounted

striking and strangling Hoff after she stated that she would tell
1. Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1339 (1984).
2. Id. at 1339. On September 17, 1973, the victim was discovered in the bedroom of
her apartment. Death was attributed to lack of oxygen, either by anoxia or asphyxiation.
Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338 (1984).
3. 104 S. Ct. at 1339.
4. Id. Apparently Stumes waived extradition under Wisconsin law. Brief for Respondent at 4, Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338 (1984).
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). See infra note 75.
6. 104 S. Ct. at 1340.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Stumes admitted he had been in Hoffs apartment the night of the killing and
that they had had intercourse, but he denied having anything to do with her death. Id.
10. Id.
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someone that she and Stumes had slept together." He also agreed
to give a statement to the police when they reached Sioux Falls,
saying he did not care what his attorney said, he would talk to
12
anybody he wanted to.
The trial court refused to suppress any of Stumes' statements to
the police and a jury subsequently convicted Stumes of first-degree
manslaughter and sentenced him to life imprisonment."3 On direct
appeal," the South Dakota Supreme Court automatically affirmed
the conviction after the trial court, on remand, determined that
the statements were made voluntarily.' A write of habeas corpus 6
was denied by the federal district court after an evidentiary hearing.1 7 While Stumes' appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court held, in Edwards v. Arizona,'8 that once a suspect has
invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent conversation must be
initiated by him.' 9 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
applied Edwards and found that the police acted unconstitutionally by twice renewing interrogation after Stumes had invoked the
right to counsel.2" The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Edwards v. Arizona should be applied
11. Id. Stumes confessed to killing Hoff after being urged by one of the police officers
to "get it off his chest." Id.
12. Id. After Stumes had been placed in his cell in Sioux Falls, he asked for one of the
officers who had accompanied him from Green Bay, and then told him that Joyce Hoff's
death had been accidental and that he was not a vicious killer. Brief for Petitioner at 29-30.
13. 104 S. Ct. at 1340.
14. Id. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-32-2 (1978). The statute provides for an
appeal to be taken to the Supreme Court of South Dakota from final judgment of conviction. Id.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 1340.
16. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). The statute provides for writ of habeas corpus by
a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court, for a determination that such
custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Id.
17. 104 S. Ct. at 1340. The district court concluded that Stumes had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Id. The court found that the afternoon
session of questioning was unconstitutional because the officers had failed to reinform
Stumes of his rights. It decided, however, that the admission of that evidence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1340 n.1. See Stumes v. Solem, 511 F. Supp. 1312 (1981).
18. 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
19. 104 S. Ct. at 1340. See 451 U.S. at 484-85.
20. 104 S. Ct. at 1340-41. The court found that Stumes' agreement to speak when the
police resumed questioning was not a valid waiver. It also found that his comment that the
taking of a human life was useless did not constitute an initiation of a new conversation
about the homicide because he had been interrogated on and off during the whole trip, with
the incriminating statement being prompted by the officer's invitation to get it off his chest.
The court did not consider whether Edwards should be applied retroactively. Id. at 1341
n.2.
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retroactively.21
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice White.2 2 He
noted that as a rule judicial opinions apply "retroactively, 2 3 but
nevertheless held that the Court of Appeals had erred in applying
Edwards to Stumes' case.24 Relying on the basic principles of retroactivity for criminal cases established in cases such as Linkletter
v. Walker,2 5 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,26 Johnson v.
New Jersey,27 and Stovall v. Denno, s the majority indicated there
were three criteria to consider in determining if new constitutional
rules should be applied retroactively.2 9 First, courts must look at
the purpose to be served by the new standard. 0 Second, they must
determine the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standard.3 ' Finally, they must examine the effect
retroactive application of the new rule would have on the administration of justice.3 2
With regard to the first factor, Justice White noted that complete retroactive effect would be most appropriate where the new
rule enhanced the accuracy of the criminal trial.3 3 He found, however, that the Edwards rule did not meet this test, because it had
only a tangential relation to truthfinding at trial.3 " According to
Justice White, there was nothing to suggest that the suppression of
statements taken after a suspect has requested counsel will automatically improve the factfinding process.3 " In his opinion, the Ed21. Id. at 1341. The Court assumed for the purposes of review, that the conduct at
issue in this case violated Edwards. Id.
22. Id. at 1339. Justice White was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
23. 104 S. Ct. at 1341. See Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1973).
24. 104 S. Ct. at 1341. The Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration under
pre-Edwards law. Id.
25. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
26. 382 U.S. 406 (1966). See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
27. 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
28. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
29. 104 S. Ct. at 1341 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967)).
30. 104 S. Ct. at 1341.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1342.
34. See id. at 1342-43.
35. See id. According to Justice White, "[tihe fact that a suspect has requested a lawyer does not mean that statements he makes in response to subsequent police questioning
are likely to be inaccurate." Id. He added, however, that "[even] in those situations where
renewed interrogation raises significant doubt as to the voluntariness and reliability of the
statement and, therefore, the accuracy of the outcome at trial, it is likely that suppression
could be achieved without reliance on the prophylactic rule adopted in Edwards." Id. at

792
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wards rule was merely
a protective measure designed to safeguard
36
pre-existing rights.
In considering the reliance factor, Justice White noted that even
though Edwards did not overrule any prior decision or transform
standard practice, it did establish a new bright-line rule that had
not been clearly foreshadowed by earlier cases.37 He explained that
police officers could not have anticipated the Edwards rule because
prior to Edwards the law was unsettled with regard to when police
officers could resume questioning of a suspect who had requested
counsel.3 8 Because of this, Justice White concluded that law enforcement officials were justified in relying on the law as it existed
39
prior to the Edwards decision.
In addressing the third and final factor, Justice White determined that retroactive application of the Edwards rule would disrupt the administration of justice, it would require new investigations and possible retrials, which would be hampered by problems
of lost evidence, faulty memory, and missing witnesses.4 0
By thus weighing the factors listed in the Linkletter, Tehan,
Johnson, and Stovall cases, Justice White was able to conclude
1
that the Edwards rule should not be applied retroactively.'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell maintained that a new
1342.
36. Id. at 1343. Justice White noted that although Edwards is not entirely unrelated
to the accuracy of criminal trials, it is not the sort of decision that should be applied retroactively because it does not go to the heart of the truthfinding function. Id.
37. Id. at 1343-45. Justice White explained that prior to Edwards, the issue of whether
a waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary and intelligent was decided on a
case by case basis, which resulted in disagreement among the lower courts as to the state of
the law. Edwards, however, established a per se approach: the suspect had to initiate subsequent conversation. In effect, Edwards had laid down a new guideline for the implementation of Miranda v. Arizona, which had not been fully anticipated by that decision. Id. at
1343-45.
38. Id. at 1344. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362, 1370 n.16 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791, 796 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977). Some courts
prohibited resumption of questioning unless initiated by the suspect. See e.g., United States
v. Womack, 542 F.2d 1047, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491,
493 (5th Cir. 1969). On the other hand, a number of courts allowed renewed interrogation
after a request for counsel. See, e.g., White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1979),
vacated, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981); Blasingame v. Estelle, 604 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
919 (1978); Hill v. Whealen, 490 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1974).
39. 104 S. Ct. at 1343-45.
40. Id. at 1345.
41. Id. Justice White limited the holding in Stumes to mean nonretroactivity in collateral review of a final conviction, leaving open the question of where the line should be drawn
in other circumstances. Id.
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rule of constitutional law should be applied only when the court is
reviewing convictions that were not yet final when the new rule
was announced. 2 He indicated that this approach was consistent
with the purpose of habeas review, which requires the court to determine if the conviction rested upon the correct application of the
law in effect at the time of the conviction. 43 With this in mind, he
determined that the retroactive application of new constitutional
rules did little to advance the purposes of collateral review on
habeas."' Justice Powell added that the costs imposed upon the
state by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law
far outweighed the benefit of their application; therefore, he found
it unnecessary to consider the Linkletter/StovaUl factors.' 5
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent,' 6 stated that there was no basis for the majority's finding that Edwards established a new rule
of law.47 He believed it was well settled, prior to Edwards, that the
police may not interrogate a prisoner after he had asked for the
-assistance of counsel. 48 In Justice Stevens' opinion, the Edwards
decision simply restated a rule that had been part of the law since
Miranda v. Arizona4 was decided. 5 Justice Stevens also noted
that Edwards itself made it clear that the rule reconfirmed in that
case had been part of the law ever since Miranda was decided. 5'
Justice Stevens also took issue with the majority's analysis of
retroactivity, 52 criticizing the majority's test because it denied retroactive application to cases that allegedly settled previously unsettled questions of law. 53 According to Justice Stevens, such a test
was, in reality, no test at all because if the law had to be com42. Id. at 1347 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S.
233, 246-48 (1977) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)).
43. Id. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-95 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. 104 S. Ct. at 1347 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1348 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice
Stevens in dissent. Id.
47. See id. at 1348-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1348.
49. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
50. 104 S. Ct. at 1351 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the Edwards rule was at most a modest extension of existing doctrine. Id. at 1353.
51. Id. at 1350. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Edwards opinion expressly stated that it
was inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities to reinterrogate an accused in custody, if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel. Id. See Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. at 484-85.
52. 104 S. Ct. at 1351-54. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 1354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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pletely settled before a new case could be applied retroactively,
then no question of retroactivity could ever arise.5 4
The decision by the Court not to apply the Edwards rule retroactively was predictable in light of a series of cases decided since
1965. 55 Prior to that time, both the common-law and the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court recognized a general rule of
retroactivity.56 But in 1965, the Court decided the landmark case
of Linkletter v. Walker, 57 and declined to apply retroactively the
rule established in Mapp v. Ohio. 55 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court discussed the traditional, common-law, Blackstonian view,
in which all overruling decisions were applied retroactively, 5 and
the somewhat newer Austinian view, which allowed for a prospective application only.60 After analyzing these competing conceptual
and jurisprudential theories, the Linkletter Court determined that
the Constitution neither requires nor prohibits retroactive application of a judicial decision.6 1 According to the Court, such a decision
is a matter of judicial policy, requiring the court to weigh the bene54. Id. at 1354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982); Brown v. Louisiana, 447
U.S. 323 (1980); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278
(1972); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S.
646 (1970); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U.S. 293 (1966).
56. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973). See e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (retroactivity generally applicable). But see Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940) ("a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity [of a statute declared unconstitutional] cannot be justified.").
57. 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965). In Linkletter, the Court denied relief on collateral attack,
but upheld the application of Mapp to all cases pending when Mapp was decided. It was
also applied to the litigants at bar. Id. at 626.
58. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, evidence obtained through an unreasonable search
and seizure was excluded from state criminal proceedings. Id. at 660. See Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling ConstitutionalDecision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
650 (1962), for a pre-Linkletter look at the retroactivity of Mapp.
59. 381 U.S. at 622-23. The Blackstonian theory made all overruling decisions retroactive as well as prospective. This view resulted from the notion that the court is merely a
discoverer of the law and not the maker, so in overruling the decision, the court discovers
what the law really was and considers it as if it always had been. Id. See J. GRAY, NATURE
AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 222 (1st ed. 1909); Shulman, Retroactive Legislation, in 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 355, 356 (1934).
60. 381 U.S. at 624. Austin maintained that cases could be applied prospectively only.
This was based on the theory that judges do more than discover the law, but also "fill in"
the law. He believed that although an overruled case had been wrongly decided, the overruling decision did not erase cases decided under it. Id. See Chicot County Drainage District v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
61. 381 U.S. at 629.
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fits against the detriments in each case. 2 It identified as relevant
to the determination of retroactivity the prior history of the rule in
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard the rule. 3 Applying these criteria, the
Linkletter Court found that the deterrent purpose of Mapp would
not be served by a retroactive application. 4
65
The following year, in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
the Court declined to give retroactive effect to Griffin v. Califor6 where the Court
nia,"
prohibited prosecutors and judges from
commenting adversely on a defendant's failure to testify. Using
the determinative factors announced in Linkletter, the Tehan
Court emphasized the reliance of judges and prosecutors, downplayed the rather limited effect a retroactive application would
have on the administration of justice and concluded that the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not go to the
heart of the truthfinding process.6 8
After Linkletter and Tehan, it appeared the Court would apply
the principle that newly declared constitutional rules of criminal
procedure would at least be applied retroactively to cases still on
direct review. 9 However, in Johnson v. New Jersey,7" decided the
same year as Tehan, and in Stovall v. Denno,7 ' decided the next
year, the Court abandoned that principle and conceded that application of its pertinent criteria did not produce a clear result.7 2 The
Court found it necessary to balance the determinative factors and
admitted that it was dealing with a question of probabilities in
terms of whether the truthfinding process was affected. 73 The
Johnson Court, facing the question of whether to apply Escobedo
v. Illinois74 and Miranda v. Arizona15 retroactively, emphasized
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 637.
65. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
66. 308 U.S. 609 (1965). Griffin, like Mapp, had already been applied to cases on direct review without discussion of retroactivity. 382 U.S. at 409 n.3.
67. 382 U.S. at 413-14.
68. Id. at 413-18.
69. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 543 (1982).
70. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
71. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
72. 384 U.S. at 728-29.
73. Id.
74. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo held that statements elicited by the police during an
interrogation may not be used against the accused at a criminal trial where the investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into custody, the police carry out a process of interroga-

796
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the disruptive effect retroactive application would have on the administration of criminal laws and found this, plus the reliance law
enforcement officials had placed on existing interrogation practices, controlling over the purpose of the new rule. 76 The Court in
Johnson abandoned any distinction between cases on direct review
and those on collateral review, finding the reliance and effect factors sufficiently strong to warrant application of Escobedo and Mi77
randa only to trials begun after those decisions were announced.
The next case considered by the Court was Stovall v. Denno,
where for the first time, the Court recited the following considerations as being pertinent to the retroactivity/prospectivity question:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. 7 The Court also reiterated that each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own
distinct functions, its own background as precedent, and its own
impact on the administration of justice, the combination of which
vary with the dictate involved.79 Because of the balancing process
involved, different degrees of retroactivity might be called for in
different cases.80 So, although the exclusionary rules fashioned by
8 2
United States v. Wade"' and Gilbert v. California
were aimed at
minimizing a miscarriage of justice at trial by preventing unfairness at the pretrial hearing, the Stovall Court found the reliance
and effect factors more important and denied retroactive applications that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and
been denied an opportunity to consult his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent. Id. at 490-91.
75. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda laid down the governing principle that, as a constitutional prerequisite to the admissibility of such statements, the suspect must, in the absence
of a clear, intelligent waiver of the constitutional rights involved, be warned before being
questioned, that he has a right to remain silent, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed, and that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him. Id. at 467-73.
76. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at 73)-31.
77. Id. at 732.
78. 388 U.S. at 297.
79. Id. See Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court and the Problem of Retroactivity, 23 EMORY L.J. 381 (1974); Note, Retroactivity and Prospectivity-Current Trends in the Law of Retroactive Decision-Making, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
500, 505 (1971).
80. 388 U.S. at 300-01. See also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966).
81. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
82. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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tion.as In doing so, it modified Johnson by focusing on the time of
the violation, rather than the commencement of the trial, in determining the cases to which the Wade/Gilbert requirement of counsel at a pre-trial hearing would apply.8 '
The Stovall Court also recognized the apparent inequities involved in applying the new rule to the parties involved, but not to
those similarly situated. It considered the fact that the parties involved were by chance beneficiaries of the new rule as insignificant
compared to its efforts to adhere to sound decisionmaking 8 5 Such
selective awards of retroactivity have served as a main point of
contention between members of the Court since the days of Linkletter. Uniformly, the dissenters have asserted that, at the least,
all defendants whose cases were still on direct appeal when the
law-changing decision was made, should be entitled to retroactive
application." But the balancing involved in the application of the
Stovall factors has, instead, led to inconsistent results. At one end
of the spectrum, the Court has rather consistently given complete
retroactive effect to a new constitutional rule where it is designed
to enhance the accuracy of criminal trials.8 7 Conversely, the Court
83. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 298-301. The Stovall case was argued and announced at the
same time as Wade and Gilbert.
84. 388 U.S. at 296.
85. Id. at 301. For a discussion of the equal protection problem involved in partial
retroactivity, see Torcia & King, The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional
Concepts, 66 DiK. L. REV. 269, 281 (1962).
86. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 545 & n.5 (citing Brown v. Louisiana, 447
U.S. 323, 337 (1980) (Powell, J., with whom Stevens, J., joined, concurring in judgment));
Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 459, 460 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Hankerson
v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 245 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 246
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 543 (1975)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., with whom
Marshall, J., joined, dissenting); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (separate
opinion of Harlan, J.); id. at 713 (Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., concurred, dissenting);
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 665 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 222 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Desist v. Unites States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 256 (Harlan,
J., dissenting); id. at 269 (Fortas, J., dissenting); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 82 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); id. at 303 (Black, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 736 (1966) (Black, J., with whom Douglas,
J., joined, dissenting); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966) (Black,
J., with whom Douglas, J., joined, dissenting); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965)
(Black, J., with whom Douglas, J., joined, dissenting)).
87. See, Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion). See
e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) (plurality opinion); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 679 (1973) (plurality opinion);
Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 205 (1972); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5
(1968); McConnell v. Rhey, 393 U.S. 2 (1968); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Jack-
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has applied some standards only to future cases, with the benefit
of the new rule not even going to the parties before the Court.88
Finally, there is the intermediate approach seen in Stovall, under
which the Court applies the change in the law to all future litigants, along-with the parties at bar. 89
Desist v. United States, decided in 1969, focused on another
problem arising out of the retroactivity doctrine.9 0 There the Court
addressed the question of whether Katz v. United States,9 1 which
had eliminated the need to show a physical trespass in order to
establish a fourth amendment search-and-seizure violation, should
be retroactively applied. The Court concluded that even though
Katz may have been foreshadowed in prior decisions, it was nonetheless a clear break with the past, and, therefore, a retroactivity
analysis was in order."2 The Desist Court also enunciated a hierarchy among the Stovall factors, claiming the most important factor
to be the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule. 93
The Court reasoned that prospectivity is supported in decisions
that amplify the evidentiary exclusionary rule, since exclusionary
rules generally are procedural weapons with no bearing on guilt
and the fairness of the trial.9" Thus, Desist brought into focus the
threshold question of whether there was a sufficient change in the
law to present a retroactivity problem and also gave some indication as to how the Court was moving in cases dealing with the
fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rules.
The exclusionary rule distinction was further refined in United
States v. Peltier,95 where two propositions were established. First,
Peltier reiterated that retroactive application of a new constitutional rule is appropriate where its major purpose goes to the
truth-finding function at trial, and so raises serious questions
son v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
88. 457 U.S. at 544. See e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (establishing
basic requirements applicable only to "future revocations of parole"). Cf. Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. at 733, (citing England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964) and James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961)).
89. See, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278
(1972) (plurality opinion); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
90. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
91. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
92. 394 U.S. at 248.
93. Id. at 249. See Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968).
94. 394 U.S. at 249-50.
95. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
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about the accuracy of a guilty verdict.9 6 Second, the Peltier Court
found that new extensions of the exclusionary rule do not serve
that purpose and concluded, therefore, that they should not be applied retroactively."7
An examination of the Court's past decisions involving the retroactivity question reveals discontent with the treatment of this issue. Commentators, along with dissenting members of the Supreme Court,s have repeatedly taken issue with the Court's
inconsistent application of the Stovall factors.9 9 Professor Beytagh
has maintained that the inconsistency in application results from
the Court's erratic treatment of retroactivity/prospectivity questions.1 00 Beytagh notes that, at times the Court gives plenary consideration of the question to a case coming some time after the
law-making decision, while at other times the Court has decided
the matter in a summary fashion, writing only a "cryptic per
curiam opinion," while at still other times, the Court has announced its resolution of the retroactivity question in the very
96. Id. at 535 (citing Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971)).
97. 422 U.S. at 535. The Court noted that "in every case in which the Court has addressed the retroactivity problem in the context of the exclusionary rule. . . the Court has
concluded that any such new constitutional principle would be awarded only prospective
application." (footnote omitted). Id. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the exclusionary
rule serves two purposes: to protect judicial integrity and to deter unconstitutional police
conduct; if the police acted in good faith in obtaining the evidence, those arguments lose
their force. Id. at 537-42. See, e.g., Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971); Williams v. United
States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
Before Peltier,courts generally assumed that if evidence was ruled to have been unconstitutionally obtained, it would be excluded as a matter of course. See Recent Development,
Retroactivity and the Exclusionary Rule: When Do the Policies Underlying the Exclusionary Rule Warrant Its Retroactive Application?-United States v. Peltier, 13 AM. CRiM.
LAW REV. 317, 323 (1975).
98. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
99. See Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1557, 1604-05 (1975), where the author states:
The Court has also been criticized for inconsistent application of its stated criteria
....
This criticism appears to be justified. The Court has never provided the lower
courts or practitioners with a thoughtful evaluation of the relative significance of the
criteria that compose the oft-invoked three-pronged test.
Id. See also Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court and the Problem of
Retroactivity, 23 EMORY L.J. 381, 402-03 (1974) ("[Tlhe Court has deviated from its announced and avowed criteria. Despite continued verbal obeisance to them, it has in practice
broken free of their restraints."(footnote omitted)); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,
544 (1982); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 61-63 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 566-67 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (finding
Court's doctrine clearly and consistently applied).
100. Beytagh, supra note 99, at 1605.
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same case in which the new constitutional rule is announced."' 1
This off-hand method of approaching retroactivity, as well as the
manner in which the Court applies the three-pronged Stovall test
10 2
to the facts of each case, has led to a result-oriented approach.
This, in turn, provides little guidance for lower courts, which must
struggle along as best they can, without workable guidelines necessary for consistent decisionmaking.
The present method of analyzing a retroactivity question is further confused by consideration of the threshold issue of what constitutes a "law-changing decision," one that properly presents a
retroactivity/prospectivity question. 103 When confronted with
landmark decisions that overrule established precedents, these
cases clearly qualify for the retroactivity analysis. Conversely,
there are cases that simply apply existing precedents to particular
and somewhat different facts. It is between these two extremes
that problems have arisen, in spite of the suggestion by the Court
in Desist that retroactivity analysis is appropriate wherever the
04
new rule involved a "clear break with the past."'

The disagreement among the Justices in Peltier and, more recently, in United States v. Johnson, 105 as well as the present case
indicates that this problem has yet to be resolved. Justice Stevens,
for example, in his Stumes dissent, pointed out that perhaps the
retroactivity question should not have been addressed at all.' 0 6 In
Stumes, the Court gave great weight to the fact that the Edwards
decision established a "new rule.'' 1 07 Whether a new rule has been

declared or not is, of course, the threshold question, with this be-.
08
ing a matter of weighing the advantages and disadvantages.1
Though the Stumes Court treated Edwards as creating a new rule,
the court engaged in no explanation of the rule, but merely assumed Edwards to have such an effect because prior case law was
101. Id. Professor Beytagh advocates a new procedural mechanism for dealing with
the retroactivity question. Id. at 1619-25. See also Hasler, Retroactivity Rethought: The
Hidden Costs, 24 ME. L. REV. 1, 20-23 (1972) ("The methods by which the retroactivity
decisions are selected for review [and announced] foster further uncertaintes [sic].").
102. As early as Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at 728-29, the Court admitted that
while the determinative criteria seemed clear, how they were applied was a question of
probabilities, a matter of degrees.
103. Beytagh, supra note 99, at 1608.
104. 394 U.S. at 248.
105. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
106. 104 S. Ct. at 1348 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1343-44.

108. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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unsettled in some of the lower courts.10 9 As pointed out by Justice
Stevens, this method of defining a new rule was unprecedented.1 10
In Hanover Shoe, Inc., v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,"' for example, the Court held that its endorsement of a rule of antitrust
law that was previously followed by only the Second Circuit did
not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes. There the
Court looked for an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine, but
found only an extension of doctrines which had been growing and
developing over the years." 2 Recently, in United States v. Johnson, the Court considered whether a holding that the fourth
amendment prohibits warrantless arrests of persons in their homes
was a new rule of law." 3 In holding that it was not, the Court
looked for a sharp break and noted that a new rule would be recognized only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of
the Court, disapproves a practice that the Court arguably has sanctioned in past cases, or overturns a longstanding and widespread
practice to which this Court has not spoken but which a nearly
unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved." 4 As discussed above, the Stumes Court has downplayed
the fact that Edwards was not a clear break and instead concentrated on the fact that the law in the lower courts was unsettled
prior to Edwards." 5
The wisdom of the Court's most recent vacillation in approach is
open to question. As the Court noted only two years earlier in
Johnson, not applying a rule retroactively because the law was unsettled prior to the ruling would be absurd, since cases involving
clear, pre-existing guidelines raise no real problems of retroactivity." 6 Again, the Court's application of the rule tends to illustrate
a result-oriented approach.
Perhaps the most important issue raised by the Court's current
approach to retroactivity is that it produces inequality of treat109. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
110. 104 S. Ct. at 1352 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
112. Id. at 497-99.
113. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537. The Stumes majority distinguished this
recent case from the Stumes case, as Johnson involved the fourth amendment, was not
controlled by prior precedent and did not arise on collateral review. 104 S. Ct. at 1341 n.3.
See generally Note, Retroactivity and the Exclusionary Rule: A Unifying Approach, 97
HARv. L. REV. 961 (1984); Note, United States v. Johnson: Reformulating the Retroactivity
Doctrine, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 166 (1983).
114. 457 U.S. at 542-48, 551.
115. 104 S. Ct. at 1343-44.
116. 457 U.S. at 559-60.
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ment for individuals similarly situated." 7 It was the Stovall Court
that stated that defendants in law-changing decisions were
"chance beneficiaries," with the new rules applying to them because of the Article III case-or-controversy requirement and because sound decisionmaking forbade allowing a new rule to stand
as mere dictum.1 18 Despite criticism by other Justices in various
cases, and despite Justice Douglas' repeated disagreement with the
Stovall language, the Court has consistently adhered to the
"chance beneficiary approach.""1 " At least one commentator has
found this approach to be lacking, asserting that the only way for
the Court to avoid unequal treatment would be to adopt either full
retroactivity or pure prospectivity."2 O The same writer endorses
pure prospectivity, which would provide the consistency the lower
courts have been looking for as well as provide for the equality of
treatment that is lacking under the current approach. 21
When considered as a whole, the entire retroactivity issue, from
the threshold issue of whether a law-changing decision has been
presented to the dilemma of whether similarly situated defendants
should be treated differently, is fraught with uncertainty. Justice
Harlan perbaps offered the best articulation of the problem when
he labeled the Court's retroactivity doctrine as "ambulatory.' ' 22
One of the reasons proffered for such a description was that initially some members of the Court grasped the retroactivity doctrine as a way of limiting the reach of decisions which they thought
were fundamentally unsound, while others used it as a technique
to implement long overdue reforms. 2 2 This brought about a caseby-case realignment of the Justices and resulted in incompatible
117. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. See also Beytagh, supra note 99,
at 1602-04, 1612-17; Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 201-04 (1965); Haddad, "Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A
Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine,60 J. CalM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 417,
438 (1969); Torcia & King, supra note 85, at 289. See generally Comment, PartialRetroac-

tivity: A Question of Equal Protection, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 239 (1970).
The Stumes Court sidestepped this issue by ruling that its decision would be applicable
only to cases on collateral review, allowing for a different result if the question had arisen on
direct review. 103 S. Ct. at 1345-46.
118. 388 U.S. at 301.
119. Beytagh, supra note 99, at 1603.
120. Id. Professor Beytagh dismisses the Stovall interpretation of Article III as
preventing the Court from adopting pure prospectivity. Id.
121. Id. at 1603-05.
122. 457 U.S. at 546 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
123. 401 U.S. at 676 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and inconsistent principles. 2
This seems to be the case even today. Indeed, when the language
of Edwards itself said that it was inconsistent with Miranda and
its progeny for the authorities to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel,' 25 it is not surprising that the lower court did not perceive Edwards as creating a
new rule and automatically applied it to the Stumes appeal without addressing retroactivity. What is surprising, however, is that
the Stumes Court rejected this application and its United States
v. Johnson rationale of two years earlier, and found that Edwards
created a new rule of constitutional law. Justice Harlan called for
the Court to rethink its doctrine. 2 Now is the time.
Theresa Carpinello Homady

124. Id. Justice Harlan also asserted that when similarly situated defendants come
before the Court, basic judicial tradition would demand granting the same relief for all. To
do this he advocated retroactive application to all cases still on direct review. 457 U.S. at
546-47 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
125. 451 U.S. at 484-85. Justice Stevens noted that "[tihe fact that some police departments may have failed to heed the plain language of the Miranda opinion certainly is
not a justification for reaching the conclusion that the reconfirmation of what was said in
Miranda should be regarded as a new constitutional rule." 104 S. Ct. at 1351 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
126. 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

